7266. Criminal Law and Moral Psychology

Most jurists and scholars have found it obvious that Mens Rea, or a ‘guilty mind,’ should play an important role in criminal liability. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once put the point: “even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.” However, while the importance of a ‘guilty mind’ requirement in criminal law is nearly universally accepted, questions about the kinds of mental states and psychological capacities required for an actor to have a ‘guilty mind’ or to be morally or criminally blameworthy for their actions remains a source of ongoing disagreement and confusion. This Seminar will explore and critically examine the role of intention, negligence, and related mental states connected to agency, personal responsibility, and the assessment of a ‘guilty mind’ in ethical theory and criminal law. Readings will canvas new approaches in law, philosophy, and cognitive science in addressing questions about the nature of these mental states, their connection to moral and criminal culpability, and possible avenues of criminal legal reform. Question to be considered include: What kinds of mental states are required for an actor to be morally culpable for their actions? Must an agent intend a wrongful action to be morally blameworthy, or can negligence actors also be blameworthy for harmful consequences they are ignorant of? Does it make sense to hold people morally responsible for their beliefs or emotions? Does it make sense to hold them legally responsible? What are the limits of moral and legal responsibility? How should advances in our understanding of the brain and the psychological mechanisms of mental illness affect our views about those limits?